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Abstract 
The coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for corruption, fraud, and self-dealing that 
can be explained by the underlying political-economic incentives at work. Three characteristics 
of the COVID-19 crisis are especially important. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the 
accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential resources. 
Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both healthcare and economic 
stabilization) at an unprecedented scale, creating opportunities for rent-seeking of many kinds, 
including outright corruption. Third, politicians, bureaucrats and medical professionals exercise 
substantial discretion in the allocation of resources. A lack of transparency and weak oversight 
and enforcement have exacerbated the problems of corruption and fraud, and public measures 
against these offenses have not kept pace with the developing crisis. The paper discusses how 
these features interact in procurement processes, in government assistance to individuals and 
businesses, and in the development and licensing of pharmaceuticals. Those who benefit from 
corruption, be they contractors or individuals, will emerge from the pandemic better off than 
before it started if governments do not act. Tolerance of malfeasance will be at the expense of 
long-term government legitimacy and spread the virus to the most vulnerable. The need for a 
speedy response to the pandemic should not be an excuse for undermining institutions that 
strengthen governmental integrity. 
Keywords 
Adverse selection, beneficial ownership, coronavirus, corruption, COVID-19, fraud, 
government contracting, healthcare, lotteries, moral hazard, pandemic, pharmaceuticals, 
procurement (government), vaccine, whistleblowers. 
Resumen 
La pandemia del coronavirus ha generado incentivos a la corrupción, al fraude y la auto-
contratación que pueden ser explicados mediante los incentivos político-económicos que se 
tratan en el trabajo. Tres características de la crisis de la COVID-19 son especialmente 
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importantes. En primer lugar, el rápido desarrollo de la pandemia y la correlativa recesión 
económica han conducido a una feroz competencia por los recursos esenciales. En segundo 
lugar, los gobiernos han movilizado rápidamente fondos públicos (tanto para el sistema 
sanitario como para la estabilidad económica) en una escala sin precedentes, creando 
oportunidades de muchos tipos para la captación de dinero fácil, incluyendo las abiertamente 
corruptas. En tercer lugar, los funcionarios y los profesionales sanitarios ejercen una 
discrecionalidad sustancial en la asignación de recursos. La pérdida de transparencia y de 
debilitamiento de la supervisión y del cumplimento de las normas ha exacerbado los problemas 
de corrupción y de fraude, y las medidas públicas contra esos delitos no han mantenido el 
paso al desarrollo de la crisis. El trabajo discute cómo esas características interactúan en los 
procesos de adquisiciones y suministros, en la asistencia gubernamental a las personas y a 
las empresas y en el desarrollo y autorización de los medicamentos. Aquellos que se 
benefician de la corrupción, sean contratistas o particulares, saldrán de la pandemia mejor que 
lo que entraron si los gobiernos no actúan. La tolerancia de las actividades ilícitas será a costa 
de la legitimidad del gobierno a largo plazo y extenderá el virus entre los más vulnerables. La 
necesidad de una respuesta rápida a la pandemia no debería ser una excusa para debilitar a 
las instituciones sino una razón para fortalecer la integridad gubernamental. 
 
Palabras clave 
Alertadores, coronavirus, corrupción, COVID-19, contratación pública, fraude, medicamentos, 
pandemia, riesgo moral, selección adversa, servicio de salud, sorteos, suministros (públicos), 
titularidad final, vacuna.  
 
 
SUMMARY. 1. Introduction. 2. Expedited Procurement Processes. 3. 
Rapid Allocation of Government Assistance to Individuals and 





Wars, catastrophes, and disasters breed fraud and corruption at the same time as they 
generate acts of self-sacrifice and generosity. Generous actions may themselves 
involve illicit payoffs and the breaking of rules as people bump up against institutions 
and practices designed for ordinary times. Nevertheless, the widespread flouting of 
the rules, both legal norms and social practices, can hinder efforts to bring the situation 
under control and have long-term effects after the end of the crisis1. These dual short- 
and long-term problems are manifest in the corruption and fraud accompanying the 
response to the novel coronavirus. An April 2020 survey of anti-fraud professionals in 
58 countries reported widespread incidents of fraud in the acquisition of personal 
protective equipment, black market goods, and faulty equipment. Cases of 
embezzlement were reported in 58 percent of countries surveyed by 19 percent of 
respondents, distributed unequally across the countries’ surveyed. Bribes were 
reported in 22 percent of countries by three percent of respondents (Nemexis, 2020). 
Much corruption, of course, never comes to light so the study does not permit one to 
measure the incidence and impact of malfeasance, but other investigations and press 
reports document its occurrence in a wide range of countries2. Furthermore, even with 
no explicit payoffs, contracts may favor the cronies of the politically powerful3. 
                                                 
1 On corruption risks in countries emerging from civil war see: Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, pp. 
316-340). For more details see: Rose-Ackerman (2009). 
2 For example, see: Slattery and Brito (2020); URN (2020); Gascón Barberá (2020). 
3 For example, see: Sishi and Winning (2020); Harris, et al. (2020); Bradley, Gebredekidan and McCann 
(2020); Maswood (2020). 
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Corruption may accompany any rapidly developing crisis that leads to loss of 
life, widespread injury and illness, or destruction of property. Taking a political-
economy approach, this essay isolates several reasons for this connection illustrated 
by, but not unique to, the current pandemic4. 
First, governments need to respond quickly to a crisis, such as a hurricane, a 
wildfire, or an earthquake. Some governments will have set aside reserve funds and 
personnel, but other polities will have skimped on spending, judging it to be 
improvident to divert funds from citizens’ day-to-day needs or to acknowledge low-
probability risks. Regardless of resource constraints, many governments simply 
neglect to provide for even quite predictable disasters; responses to wildfires in 
California, earthquakes along the “ring of fire”, or urban unrest may be underfunded, 
and preventive actions, such as building codes, fire resistant housing, and police 
training may have low priority. Then, what could have been a routine response to a 
predictable event becomes a desperate race against time with devastating 
consequences5.  
As a result, governments spend large amounts of money and make regulatory 
changes in a short time period with little oversight, precisely when the very speed of 
the response suggests that oversight is especially needed. Such haphazard 
responses can cement political patronage and result in waste and fraud at the expense 
of equity and effectiveness.  
Second, in the case of COVID-19, the need for a rapid response is not the only 
risk factor; multiple sources of uncertainty complicate the policy response. The virus 
was and remains poorly understood. When the pandemic began, there were no 
vaccines to limit the risk of infection or proven anti-viral medicines to give to those 
afflicted. There was considerable uncertainty about the best strategies with respect 
testing, treatment, and safety protocols that balance safety with ongoing economic and 
social life. Several vaccines have now obtained regulatory approval in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, but the effectiveness of distribution networks remains uncertain (Financial 
Times, 2020, December 4).  
Further, governments may need to make unexpected regulatory changes with 
few precedents to draw on. For example, governments across the world are constantly 
under pressure to decide on the timing, length, and severity of lockdowns, with no way 
to satisfy all constituencies. Utilizing the existing capability for online diagnosis during 
a pandemic meant resolving conflicts with privacy regulations and creating new 
guidelines for widespread use (Sultan Mahmood, et al., 2020). 
In such situations, much depends upon the professional integrity of both market 
actors and government agencies to guard against the opportunities for corrupt or, at 
least, self-serving behavior. The corrupt opportunities presented by severe uncertainty 
go beyond bribery or fraud. Profit-seeking individuals and firms may take advantage 
of market disruptions and regulatory loopholes at the public’s expense. Thus, the 
pandemic has exacerbated the risks of corruption that exist whenever public officials 
                                                 
4 International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, are acutely aware of these risks. 
See: World Bank Group (2020, April 28); Gaspar, Mühleisen and Weeks-Brown (2020). A webpage 
provides links to other World Bank material on governance and the response to COVID-19: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/governance-institutions-covid-19-response-
resources  
5 For example, see: Sullivan (2018).  
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are charged with allocating scarce benefits and costs under unclear or inconsistent 
legal rules6. 
Third, the healthcare sector differs from the ordinary competitive market even 
in normal times, and market imperfections arise in the accompanying insurance 
markets. Some libertarians argue that society can depend upon the private sector to 
respond promptly. Competitive markets, according to that view, will rush to develop 
the needed tests, vaccines, and anti-viral medicines, and government interventions to 
increase accessibility to these goods will only remove the producers’ profit motives7. 
Individuals, at the same time, will take precautions to protect themselves without the 
need for government action. Under this view, even if society does not achieve herd 
immunity through widespread infection, individual choices are preferable to imposed 
lockdowns8.  
However, this perspective ignores the pervasive market imperfections in 
healthcare9. Consumers are largely ignorant of the proper treatments for their 
ailments, reinforcing the need to enforce the professional competence and integrity of 
providers. Insurance is subject to moral hazard and adverse selection (Arrow, 1963; 
Powell and Goldman, 2020). Individuals may not truthfully reveal their underlying 
health conditions to insurance companies if insurers seek to set prices to reflect an 
individual’s risk of making a claim. Once insured, they may demand excessive care 
because they do not bear its full cost out of their own pockets (moral hazard). Such 
actions will increase the breakeven cost of insurance and make certain types of 
coverage unavailable. In addition, if insurance companies cannot adjust their prices to 
reflect the risks to their bottom line, the healthy may forgo insurance, leading the 
insurance system to unravel because it depends upon the averaging out of claims 
across policyholders (adverse selection). In short, unlike many natural disasters, the 
underlying structure of the relevant sector (healthcare) is riddled with inefficiencies that 
have been exacerbated by the pandemic. Of course, there can be price gouging and 
corruptly obtained contracts for recovery from natural disasters and human conflicts, 
but having healthcare at the center of recovery creates special problems.  
*** 
As the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe 
observed in its guidance to member states:  
[Covid-related corruption can take the form of] facilitation payments/bribes to push 
ahead processes that may have stalled due to shortages of staff or closure of public 
offices, falsification of documents to meet the conditions of State aid schemes for 
pandemic relief measures, bypassing product certification requirements, non-
certification of alternative supply chains, donations, lack of resources to supervise 
misconduct by individual employees, etc. (2020, p. 5). 
These three characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis, taken together, have 
significantly increased corruption risks. First, the rapidly unfolding pandemic and the 
accompanying economic recession have led to fierce competition for essential 
resources. Second, governments have rapidly mobilized public funds (for both 
healthcare and economic stabilization) at an unprecedented scale, creating 
opportunities for rent-seeking of many kinds, including outright corruption. Third, 
                                                 
6 The background incentives for bureaucratic corruption are outlined in: Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016 
pp. 51-92). 
7 See: Lybecker (2020); Swan and Gerstein (2020). 
8 See: Brumfiel and Keith (2020); Cannon (2020). 
9 The economics of healthcare is a well-developed field of study that was launched by a classic article by 
Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care” (1963). 
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politicians, bureaucrats and medical professionals exercise substantial discretion in 
the allocation of resources. A lack of transparency and weak oversight and 
enforcement have exacerbated the problems of corruption and fraud, and public 
measures against these offenses have not kept pace with the developing crisis. I 
discuss how these features interact in procurement processes (section 2), in 
government assistance to individuals and businesses (section 3), and in the 
development and licensing of pharmaceuticals (section 4). 
2. Expedited Procurement Processes  
Awarding government contracts during a public emergency faces challenges that differ 
from those that arise in normal times. Procurement is usually a buyers’ market, with 
the contracting agency holding significant leverage over suppliers. However, during 
an emergency, time pressures and a lack of qualified suppliers may undermine clarity 
and transparency in the contracting process, creating a favorable environment for 
firms to engage in bid-ridding, price-gouging, and fraud10.  
Examples abound. To list just a few, in the United States, contracts worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars were awarded to companies with little or no prior 
experience in producing the needed goods, including those in the arms industry or with 
histories of fraud11. In Slovenia, of the approximately 80 million euros in contracts 
awarded in the last week of March 2020, thirty-five percent went to a firm controlled 
by a mainstay of the gambling industry who had no previous experience in healthcare 
(Delic and Zwitter, 2020). In Poland, over $60 million was wired to a supplier that never 
delivered the medical equipment (Slattery and Brito, 2020).  
Even if goods and services are delivered, they may be supplied at much higher 
prices than in normal times12. In Colombia, when officials began giving food boxes to 
families hit by the coronavirus lockdown, one lawmaker noted the exorbitant prices 
paid to vendors. An inquiry revealed that the state was paying more than double the 
market price of certain goods, for example $2.81 for 250 grams of coffee that retailed 
for $1.20 at grocery stores (Faiola and Herrero, 2020). Kenya’s anti-corruption 
commission revealed a similar problem, with state agencies paying 60 percent higher 
for goods than their market prices (Malalo, 2020). 
In several countries, contracts awarded to those with ties to those in power 
raised eyebrows. In the United Kingdom, contracts were given to companies whose 
shareholders, board members, and employees include present and former high-level 
public officials (Tabby Kinder, et al., 2020). South Africa’s ruling party was met with a 
public uproar after the husband of the president’s spokesperson won PPE contracts 
(Sishi and Winning, 2020). One study shows that local governments in Colombia with 
historically high levels of corruption were more likely to award contracts to campaign 
donors and experience cost overruns and inefficiencies during the COVID-19 crisis 
(Jorge Gallego, et al., 2020). 
Even after fraud schemes are discovered, it is sometimes difficult or impossible 
to hold violators accountable and recover losses. Under-performing contractors may 
be judgment-proof or have disappeared into a maze of shell companies leaving no 
trace. The U.S. FBI identified numerous incidents of lost funds that were wired to 
                                                 
10 These incentives come on top of the background risks of corruption in procurement discussed in Rose-
Ackerman and Palifka (2016, pp. 99-109). The relative bargaining power of public officials versus private 
firm suppliers determines the level of payoffs, but may not affect their incidence. 
11 See: Gabrielson, et al., (2020); Salman and Penzenstadler (2020); Gelles and Abrams (2020).  
12 See: Malalo (2020). 
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fraudulent contractors and subsequently flowed out of the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020).  
Several types of responses are possible, but there is little systematic evidence 
about how they might be prioritized or combined. The options include: open-
contracting, pre-registration of suppliers, beneficial ownership information, freedom-
of-information acts, limits on conflicts of interest, oversight by public bodies, and 
sufficient investigative resources to bring cases promptly and to protect and reward 
whistleblowers. 
A number of international organizations and NGOs have urged the use of open 
contracting systems to combat corruption and fraud in procurement processes. As 
summarized by Open Contracting, an NGO, governments should make emergency 
procedures public, require written justification and documentation, and publish open 
data on contract terms to permit civil society oversight on a timely and regular basis 
(Open Contracting, n.d.; Amin, 2017). During the financial 2008 crisis, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act stipulated that procurement contracts not awarded 
through fixed-price competitive bidding must be disclosed on a centralized online 
platform (Congressional Research Service, 2009). The Open Government Partnership 
points with approval to Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms that oblige the open 
publication of all emergency contracts, including terms of payment and delivery, and 
value. Ukrainian civil society has developed a business intelligence tool to monitor 
medical procurement and emergency spending. It can track price differences for 
COVID-19 tests in the country’s regions and capital to check the price of critical 
medical supplies to ensure that authorities are committed to filling treatment centers, 
not private pockets (Gavin Hayma, 2020). It will be important to check if these reforms 
are able to counter Ukraine’s otherwise high levels of corruption. 
A complementary, strategy, used in Colombia, concentrates on pre-registering 
suppliers. An emergency decree governs public procurement during the COVID crisis, 
allowing expedited procedures to procure the necessary goods and services. The 
National Procurement Agency, Colombia Compra Eficiente (CCE), has asked all 
companies that want to supply these critical products to register. CCE verifies the 
information and includes qualified suppliers in a framework agreement, allowing 
agencies from all over the country to procure efficiently, and to compare online prices 
and characteristics13. 
These measures could help limit conflicts of interest in times of emergency. 
Any realistic set of rules needs to acknowledge that, especially in small countries or 
for specialized procurements, there may be only a few domestic suppliers. Stringent 
conflict-of-interest rules may give excessive bargaining power to the few firms 
permitted to bid. Sometimes a better response is to permit many firms to bid and adopt 
open-contracting rules that impose rigorous standards and oversight to assure value 
for money. Procurement agencies need to face clear, written requirements to maintain 
complete and accurate records and procedures for measuring the contractors’ 
suitability and performance (Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2015; Rose-Ackerman, 2014). If emergency circumstances make timely 
publication of awards impossible, the contracting authority should publish a report after 
the fact that justifies its decisions at the time (European Commission, 2020). Public 
officials, on their part, should be required to place their shares in the companies 
                                                 
13 A summary is available at Submission to OECD COVID-19 Innovation Report: https://docs.google.com 
/document/d/1Qy_7GwHMjIt71psdSkxPLwdxL3pdOEdIiiRY5D01c7Q/edit 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN                                                       Corruption and COVID-19 
 
Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad. ISSN 2253-6655 
                   Nº. 20, abril 2021 – septiembre 2021, pp. 16-36. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2021.6061 
22 
 
bidding for and benefiting from procurement contracts in a blind trust until the 
expiration of the programs (Oldfield, 2020).  
In order to check for fraud and to recover misused funds, governments and 
civil-society watchdogs need to know the beneficial owners of the firms that obtain 
contracts. Certain countries have cited the crisis as a reason to delay compliance with 
transparency and beneficial ownership requirements. For example, the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in the U.S. Department of the Treasury has 
announced that for eligible federally insured depository institutions, Paycheck 
Protection Programs (PPP) loans “will not require reverification” of existing customers’ 
beneficial ownership information “under applicable BSA (Bank Secrecy Act) 
requirements, unless otherwise indicated by the institution’s risk-based approach to 
BSA compliance” (Wolf, 2020). A similar weakening of the rules has occurred in the 
Bahamas where the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Register of 
Beneficial Ownership Act has been suspended during the public emergency and for 
an additional 60 days after it has passed (Renee Farquharson, 2020). The Polish 
government extended the deadline for registering beneficial owners, which already 
had a low rate of compliance (Linklaters, 2020).  
The weakening of transparency rules under the excuse of relieving the burden 
on business can backfire. Such a policy exposes businesses and individuals to a 
heightened risk of fraud and corruption, undermining the effectiveness of the 
programs. Registries of potential suppliers and data on signed contracts must make it 
possible to trace the beneficial owners of government contracts, especially if they 
reside outside a jurisdiction’s borders14. As a step in that direction, the IMF reports that 
Gabon, Moldova, and Nigeria have committed to publishing information on crisis-
related public procurement and beneficial owners of companies contracting with the 
government (International Monetary Fund, 2021). The IMF hopes to use these 
programs as positive examples for others. 
If the government’s own practices are lacking, civil society may be able to make 
use of the Freedom-of-Information Acts (FOIAs) available in many countries. These 
acts, which have spread globally in recent years, allow anyone –including ordinary 
citizens, civil society groups, and the media– to request information from the 
government (Ackerman and Sandoval, 2006). They can be potent tools if they do not 
have too many open-ended exemptions and if the government promptly and 
adequately responds to requests. Although up-front disclosure is a simpler and more 
streamlined way to provide information, ex post FOIA requests can supplement open-
contracting laws by assuring that the required information is available to the public.  
Yet, during a crisis, responding to such requests may be a low priority. The 
government may permit the temporary relaxation of FOIA rules to allow flexibility in an 
emergency. Some jurisdictions have explicitly extended deadlines for responding to 
requests until the pandemic is over, making it clear that FOIA requests will have no 
priority15. In the U.S., civil society groups have filed lawsuits against government 
agencies that have declined to release information related to the pandemic 
response16. It remains to be seen if they will improve the effectiveness of FOIA in 
checking abuse. 
                                                 
14 See: Open Ownership (2020). 
15 See: Frary (2020); Office of the Governor State of Hawaii (2020); D.C. Policy Center (2020).  
16 For example, see: Compliant for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. Knowledge Ecology International v. 
National Institutes of Health. Case No. 8:20-cv-2927. (United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, 2020). Available here: https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/1092020KEINIHFO 
IAComplaint.pdf; Complaint. Pro Publica, Inc. v. United States Department of Health & Human Services. 
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Some governments may delay meeting FOIA requests as part of an attempt to 
quash reforms by citing the emergency as an excuse. Such actions risk making 
corruption easier to hide in the short-run and can undermine government legitimacy if 
malfeasance surfaces later. Severe economic pressure and the difficulty of obtaining 
information can pose a double hurdle to local media and oversight groups. Hence, 
prolonged and purposeful FOIA exemptions can have long-term consequences for the 
quality of governance (Vittori, 2020). 
Law enforcement investigations concentrate on criminal acts of fraud and 
corruption, but some types of misbehavior also can be prosecuted as civil offenses 
committed by private firms and as violations of civil-service rules and codes of ethics. 
In the U.S., various government institutions, including the Departments of Justice 
(DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services, can bring anti-
corruption and anti-fraud actions related to the Covid-19 crisis, including under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which criminalizes the payment of bribes to get 
business abroad17. Nevertheless, even in the U.S., the investigative capacities of 
government institutions remain limited relative to the magnitude of government 
financial outlays.  
Because many types of fraud and corruption have willing participants on both 
sides, it is especially important for prosecutors to be able to encourage and protect 
whistleblowers (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016, pp. 219-221). The survey of anti-
fraud professionals cited above indicates that whistleblower retaliation occurred in 
almost half of the countries surveyed (46%), and the problems to which whistleblowers 
pointed were diverse (Nemexis, 2020; Feinstein, 2020). Even if a whistleblower law 
exists, it may only protect a narrow range of individuals and disclosures, and the 
measures to protect the rights of whistleblowers may be inadequate (OECD Webinar, 
2020, May 22). The United States generally has stronger protections for 
whistleblowers than many other countries, and private-sector whistleblowers can earn 
bounties from reporting malfeasance involving public contracts. Nonetheless, that 
system does not always work fairly. For example, when a former Florida Department 
of Health employee alleged that she was fired after refusing to manipulate COVID-19 
data, Florida law enforcement raided her home under the charge that she attempted 
to “hack” the department by trying to log in with expired credentials (Ceballos, 2020; 
Chappell, 2020).  
In a rapidly evolving crisis, normal procedures that take months are unlikely to 
allow timely disclosure and actions. If a crisis results in severe economic stress, 
whistleblowers may be even more reluctant to engage in behavior that might cost them 
their jobs (OECD Webinar, 2020, May 22). If existing protections are insufficient, it is 
important for the legislature to include special whistleblower protections in emergency 
stimulus programs and to send consistent messages to the public stressing that 
reporting malfeasance is important and appreciated.  
Controlling price gouging needs a nuanced approach. There may be genuine 
shortages of certain products that produce temporary price increases. Although 
opportunistic cartels should be punished, price limitations may create a black market, 
and severe punishments can discourage the production of needed goods. However, 
the government can limit the upward pressure on prices by coordinating and 
centralizing procurement processes. State and local governments can leverage their 
                                                 
Case No. 20-4092 (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2020). Available 
here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6935608-2020-05-28-DE-001-Complaint-DMWEST-
40181066.html.  
17 See: Office of the Attorney General (2020); Department of Homeland Security (2020); Department of 
Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (2020). 
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collective buying power, while the national and federal government can assist with 
coordination and sourcing back-up supplies (Folliot Lalliot and Yukins, 2020). 
Nonetheless, relying solely on market mechanisms is not the solution. Aside 
from the grave ethical implications of allowing chances of survival to depend upon 
existing privileges, a pure market-based allocation is also inefficient in harnessing the 
positive externalities of certain healthcare benefits. Furthermore, because of the social 
consequences flowing from the allocation of scarce benefits, their distribution should 
be made systemically, not left to the decisions of individual physicians. 
The allocation method should depend upon the nature of supply as well as 
distributive justice concerns. As in wartime, ration tickets, lotteries, or application 
procedures may be necessary. During a pandemic, ensuring the supply of personal 
protective equipment and vaccines to medical and essential workers and then 
rationing their availability to others would be more effective in controlling the spread of 
the virus than leaving them accessible only to the well-resourced (Glazer, 2020). First-
come-first-served also has little to recommend it on the grounds of either fairness or 
efficiency, and it can incentivize some to use unofficial and illegal means to get ahead 
in the line (Meskell, 2020).  
Any approach should take into account the principle of fairness and the 
possible spillover of benefits, with appropriate safeguards against corruption (Bloom, 
2020; Bersad et al., 2009). Ideally, the allocation would be based on criteria that are 
easy to identify in order to minimize the room for discretion and manipulation. But when 
faced with an overwhelming demand from a practically indistinguishable group of 
people, a lottery system is an alternative that is fair and can be less susceptible to 
corruption if operated under transparent rules (Emanuel et al., 2020; Kenen, 2020; 
Vogel, et al., 2020). Clear communication to the public on the need for and basis of 
the rules of distribution would be key to preserving the legitimacy of the intervention 
and reducing the motivation to bypass or disobey the rules. 
An additional benefit of using a lottery to allocate a scarce experimental 
treatment is that it also has scientific merit. Faced with scarcity, all eligible patients are 
treated fairly in that all have an equal chance of being selected. In addition, as two 
medical doctors point out, the lottery itself provides information about the efficacy of 
the treatment. It permits a comparison between those who do and do not receive the 
treatment. If there is a reason to prioritize certain types of patients, such as front-line 
healthcare workers, then the lottery itself can be designed to give them a higher 
chance of selection (White and Angua, 2020). This example illustrates the value of 
nonmarket allocation methods and the need to prevent corruption and cronyism from 
undermining such methods. Leaving these choices in the hands of individual 
physicians, risks cronyism and corrupt side deals. Corrupt access is not only is unfair; 
it also prevents an adequate test of the treatment’s value in the population. 
3. Rapid Allocation of Government Assistance to Individuals and Businesses 
Many countries have set up programs of financial aid for households and business. 
The rapid rollout of emergency payments to individuals and firms amplifies bribery, 
fraud and embezzlement risks. Improper management of public funds can take various 
forms, including payments for access to medical services, payments to re-open 
businesses or avoid enforcement actions, payments to receive preferential forms or 
amounts of government assistance, and self-dealing or kickback schemes. The 
particular difficulty here is the large number of beneficiaries so that individual law-
enforcement efforts are likely excessively costly, and lawmakers are subject to 
heightened interest group pressure as businesses try to shape the distribution of 
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benefits in their favor (Vogel, et al., 2020). Studies show that in the first quarter of 
2020, when the U.S. Congress was debating the $2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security (CARES) Act, lobbying expenditures noticeably increased 
across different sectors, with the health sector’s spending and registrations rising most 
rapidly (Olson, et al., 2020). 
It is especially important to limit corrupt incentives up-front in the fundamental 
structure of stimulus programs. That may mean keeping the eligibility standards simple 
and clear-cut, even if they would not be the ideal standards in a perfectly honest world. 
For example, a World Bank study notes that in regions where the state’s administrative 
capacity remains weak, categorical targeting based on easily observable 
characteristics that are highly correlated with poverty can substitute for eligibility 
criteria that are more difficult to measure, such as income (Tabor, 2002). Regardless 
of which criteria are used, information about eligibility and the scope of benefit should 
be easily accessible and be accompanied by outreach to enhance public 
understanding of the intended beneficiaries (United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime, 2020, p. 2; Ellena, Brown and Dreher, 2020, p. 13). 
However, ex post monitoring and review remain important. Unfortunately, in 
the U.S. there appear to be weaknesses in the CARES Act’s oversight mechanisms. 
Oversight is a necessary condition to prevent malfeasance and to punish those who 
step over the line. The CARES Act mandates that the program will be overseen 
through three key mechanisms: the Congressional Oversight Commission, which 
submits monthly assessments of the Department of the Treasury’s $500 billion 
stabilization fund; the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, which oversees 
the implementation of the CARES Act to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; 
and the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery, nominated by the 
President to report on the appropriateness of the spending by the Treasury 
Department (Mellman and Eisen, 2020).  
Even though the act was passed in late March 2020, the Special Inspector 
General, who is supposed to oversee the Treasury Department’s activities, was not 
confirmed by the Senate until mid-June, more than two months after the CARES Act 
was signed (Rappeport, 2020). The chairperson of the Congressional Oversight 
Commission had not been confirmed by mid-February 2021 (Congressional Oversight 
Commission, 2021). After President Trump removed the initial chairperson of the 
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, a group of 21 inspector generals 
(IGs), the committee went ahead without an officially appointed new chairperson. The 
group is now led by the IGs from the Department of Justice and NASA (PRAC, 2021; 
The White House, 2020, March). 
Past emergencies illustrate how difficulties can arise. Consider Hurricane 
Katrina in the U.S. and the Ebola epidemic. Hurricane Katrina made a direct hit on 
New Orleans in August 2005. As reported by The Hill, the Government Accountability 
Office estimated that by June 2006 approximately $1 billion in Hurricane Katrina aid 
was improperly distributed and potentially fraudulently obtained. By 2011, 1,439 
people spanning 41 federal districts were federally charged with hurricane related 
fraud against the government. By 2014, the seventeenth New Orleans area public 
official had been arrested on federal corruption related charges, including a school 
board member, a state senator, a state representative, a judge, multiple city council 
members, a coroner, and multiple mayors. To this day, it is unclear how much aid from 
Hurricane Katrina was lost to fraud and corruption (Cortese, 2020). 
Ebola hit West Africa in 2014-2016. The International Red Cross estimated the 
cost of corruption associated with the outbreak in Guinea and Sierra Leone to be more 
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than US$6 million. Reports show that the Ebola epidemic resulted in the diversion and 
mismanagement of funds, misreporting of salaries, payments for duplicate supplies, 
and bribery of health professionals to receive medical care and leave quarantined 
zones (Divjak and Dupuy, 2015). 
To complement and encourage low-income countries to spend responsibly, 
multilateral and bilateral donors could incorporate stronger anti-corruption measures 
into aid packages. Earlier this year, the IMF and World Bank were flooded with 
requests for foreign assistance18. The multilateral lenders have maintained that all 
funds will be subject to pre-existing integrity requirements, perhaps, in part, due to 
continued lobbying by several anti-corruption NGOs. As the IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Department stated in 2020: “Do what it takes, but keep the receipts” (International 
Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs, 2020). Its Managing Director stated that “We don’t want 
accountability and transparency to take the back seat” (International Monetary Fund, 
April 15, 2020). The IMF notes that 58% of all financial agreements contain specific 
commitments to control the risk of corruption, such as auditing of COVID-19 spending 
and publishing procurement information (Berazategui, 2020; International Monetary 
Fund, 2020, June 30).  
These signaling and voluntary commitments are not sufficient to ensure that 
the funds will be spent responsibly, especially in countries with histories of endemic 
corruption. Careful documentation of spending is a necessary condition for 
accountability, but is it sufficient? What does “do what it takes” mean? It signals the 
IMF’s deference to member countries’ choices about how to respond, but in many 
cases, that may simply cement connections based on cronyism and patronage. 
Although one can understand the unwillingness of the IMF to get involved at the micro 
level in directing policy, citizens within individual countries and organized business, 
labor and civil society should not be content with ex post accountability alone. Even if 
no bribes were paid, outright fraud can occur in cases where receipts exist but where 
the contracted-for supplies were not delivered or were defective. 
Several measures have been proposed to control the risk of corruption in 
foreign aid. In the US, the Carnegie Endowment has highlighted the Countering 
Russian and Other Overseas Kleptocrats (CROOK) Act (H.R. 3843/S. 3026). The bill 
would form an Anti-Corruption Action Fund to rush support to countries eager to take 
rapid action against corruption, as the current crisis demands (Bellows, 2020). The 
proposal is budget-neutral and enjoys bipartisan support. However, as one observer 
notes, the CROOK Act does not address the causes of corruption arising from 
personal interactions and discretion created by various trade barriers and other 
distortionary regulations (Koehler, 2020). A draft bill passed by the Senate in 2019 
would have required the State Department to assess corruption risks in countries 
receiving certain U.S. foreign aid and develop appropriate anti-corruption 
mechanisms19. This year, Germany’s development ministry announced a plan to 
reduce the number of aid recipients and make good governance, respect for human 
rights, and tackling corruption the criteria for future aid cooperation (Deutsche Welle, 
2020, May 5). Other suggested mechanisms include linking the disbursement of aid to 
evidence of outcomes, such as testing and vaccination levels (Loayza, 2020). 
Although it is true that states vary in their capacity to enforce rigorous oversight, 
most states have the infrastructure and resources necessary for a basic level of budget 
controls. In the past and during the current pandemic, donor countries and agencies 
                                                 
18 See: World Bank Group (2020, May 19); International Monetary Fund (n.d.) 
19 Combating Global Corruption Act of 2019, S.1309, 116th Cong. (2019). Available here: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1309/text 
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were able to work with local governments to develop tracking systems to identify 
intended beneficiaries of relief programs (International Monetary Fund, 2020, May 19). 
Oversight in times of crisis is not a privilege reserved for developed countries. If they 
centralize and streamline crisis response spending, minimize extra-budgetary funds, 
and introduce ex-post verification, even low-income countries can significantly reduce 
lost resources. 
4. Pharmaceutical Licensing and Insider Trading 
The pandemic has generated a flood of new money into drug research and 
development, most of it from public sources. The speed with which policymakers are 
seeking solutions to the pandemic creates opportunities for companies to bypass the 
usual regulatory review to get drugs to market or into publicly financed programs. It 
can also help some drug developers to secure preferential treatment for not only 
licensing but also favorable tax treatment and other benefits. At the same time, 
intellectual property laws limit transparency in product development, reducing the 
ability of third parties to challenge company behaviors. 
One type of favorable treatment is “fast-tracking”. For example, U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) rapidly granted Gilead Sciences “orphaned drug status” for 
an experimental drug to treat COVID-19, a designation usually reserved for drugs 
treating rare diseases. That status comes with market exclusivity, tax breaks, and the 
waiving of regulatory fees (Chua and Cont, 2020). The company eventually gave up 
that status following outcry (Lupkin, 2020). The U.S. federal contracting standards for 
subsidizing medical research during the pandemic could weaken the government’s 
ability to license generic competitors if the subsidized company fails to make the 
product accessible on reasonable terms (Rowland, 2020). Under normal 
circumstances, the business practices of this industry have raised ethical concerns, 
and during the pandemic private companies may use this opportunity to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the public interest.  
The promising vaccines now receiving regulatory approval suggest that the 
pandemic may be tamed in 2021, but it will be important for governments to remain 
vigilant. Of course, drug firms should be able to make a profit from their discoveries, 
but they should not exploit the vulnerable positions of governments and patients, 
especially in low-income countries. 
Insider trading may be a concern. Four U.S. Senators were publicly accused 
of insider trading after it appeared that they personally profited from trades following a 
private all-senators coronavirus briefing (Lipton and Fandos, 2020)20. This prompted 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue a warning on non-public material 
information related to the virus (Avakian and Peikin, 2020). 
Medication and medical device production chains frequently extend across 
national boundaries, but the COVID-19 crisis has disrupted regular patterns of 
manufacture, sale, and export. As mentioned earlier, the need to contract with new 
vendors in an emergency can circumvent normal due-diligence processes. The 
imperative to obtain healthcare supplies as quickly as possible may stimulate the 
payment of bribes, for example, by company agents to regulatory and customs 
officials. Law firms are quick to point out that firms that respond rapidly potentially 
expose themselves to liability under foreign bribery and anti-money laundering laws21. 
                                                 
20 Three cases were closed in May 2020. 
21 For example, see: Kostolampros, et al. (2020). 
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Open-contracting initiatives and beneficial ownership registries can be helpful here, 
just as they can be for any kind of procurement. 
But the corrupt incentives go deeper than in other types of procurement 
because of the distinctive features of the healthcare sector. The risks arise not just 
from the need for speed and the possibility of privileged insiders obtaining special 
benefits. In addition, consumers’ lack of expertise, and the moral hazard and adverse 
selection that characterize insurance markets can raise the stakes in the fight against 
corruption in the pandemic (Arrow, 1963; Powell and Goldman, 2020). The study of 
corruption always raises the question of when to use the price system and the private 
market to allocate scare goods and services and when to select allocation methods 
based on desert, efficacy, or over-all social value. Poor information about the future is 
a problem for everyone and can lead to fatalism or to the creation of insurance markets 
to spread the risk over a certain population –for automobile accidents, life expectancy, 
risks of fire and theft– and, of course, healthcare. 
Poor information, however, is not the only problems. In addition, the same 
dollar price represents a trivial outlay to one person and a major sacrifice to another. 
The private market is a poor mechanism for the redistribution of income to those at the 
bottom. Furthermore, if consumption by one person creates spillover benefits and 
costs for others, the purchaser may not take these external effects into account. Some 
commodities cannot be parsed into individual consumption bundles. They are 
consumed in common. Even if a vaccination provides a personal benefit to an 
individual, a widespread vaccination program benefits even those who do not choose 
to get a shot.  
The healthcare sector is a prominent illustration of these distributive effects and 
market failures. Thus, even without the overlay of a pandemic, an unregulated 
competitive healthcare market is neither efficient nor fair. Rather, public policies should 
accommodate both distributive justice concerns and take account of informational 
weaknesses and external effects. In fact, the healthcare sector is hedged about with 
public programs and regulations in all polities. Health insurance is a complex mixture 
of public and private provisions in most countries, although a few have sought to 
outlaw both private provision and private insurance. For healthcare, where scarcity 
combines with regulation and where the public sector determines who is qualified to 
provide and to receive treatment, corrupt incentives exist in ordinary times and have 
increased during the pandemic22. 
For health insurance, responding to the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection can create corrupt incentives. Consider moral hazard. Individuals may 
demand healthcare with little concern for the social costs if their own out-of-pocket 
costs are low or nonexistent. However, there is an opposite force at work during the 
pandemic. Prevention and treatment are troublesome and costly for individuals, but 
the benefits of their actions are partly felt by other people who face less risk of 
exposure because of others’ preventive actions. These external benefits are a strong 
justification for requiring individuals to take costly actions that benefit both themselves 
and others. Because some of these benefits flow to strangers, individuals may not take 
them into account. To some extent, the two effects may balance out, but unfortunately, 
actions that protect others are not always the same as the ones that benefit yourself, 
your family, or your religious community. Thus, corruption and other types of shirking 
will predictably occur in those situations. For example, a restaurant owner might pay 
off inspectors to cut corners on sanitizing the premises and might fail to purchase 
                                                 
22 For example, before the pandemic, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment became major profit 
centers for Chinese hospitals and suppliers paid bribes to get contracts (Rose-Ackerman and Tan, 2015). 
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effective personal protective devices for staff. Suppliers of such devices might pay off 
officials to get approval for inadequate products that can be sold as compliant. Police 
may let people avoid lockdowns and quarantines in return for bribes23. Businesses 
using these products have little incentive to check them for efficacy partly because 
they do not have the expertise to make quality judgments and partly because their 
main concern is to attract customers by claiming to follow government guidelines.  
Now consider adverse selection where low-risk individuals opt out of insurance. 
One response to this problem is to require everyone to obtain coverage or to charge 
a fee to those who opt out, as was done in the original version of the U. S. Affordable 
Care Act24. If governments enact such rules, low-risk individuals could make payoffs 
to avoid a citation for non-compliance, or they might avoid a fine through paying a 
bribe. This incentive exists under any effort to avoid adverse selection, but it has 
additional costs during a pandemic. Now, low-risk individuals who opt out may infect 
others if they do become sick. Those who opt out may include, not only those at low-
risk, but also those who are more tolerant of risk than the average person. If that is 
true, the external costs of their lack of insurance will be especially socially harmful if 
they do become infected. Adverse selection can lead the entire insurance program to 
unravel as the refusal of some low-risk people to join increases the overall risk of the 
program, causing the newly marginal people to exit and so forth. In contrast, if those 
who opt-out are not low risk but rather have a high tolerance for all levels of risk, then 
the insured pool will not unravel. It will just cover fewer people. However, that latter 
version of adverse selection will be especially damaging in the context of a highly 
contagious disease. Now, risk-acceptant people with no social conscience may spread 
the virus to others who are either more risk averse or more susceptible to catching the 
disease and/or have life-threatening health conditions. Thus, once again there is a 
strong case for requiring everyone to take precautions and to have insurance 
coverage. The goal is not just to spread the costs broadly but also to implement 
preventive measures. Denying care or charging for uninsured healthcare may provide 
an incentive to sign-up, but those who remain outside the insurance system are 
imposing costs on others. The penalties need to reflect the external costs imposed by 
the uninsured on everyone else. However, if the program did reflect those costs, the 
individual incentives to seek an exception through corrupt payoffs could be high. 
Corrupt officials could register individuals in the program even though they had paid 
nothing to the regulatory authority. Alternatively, if the state makes insurance free to 
all so that no adverse selection occurs, moral hazard will remain a problem. Then, the 
incentives for corruption are identical to those that arise whenever the government 
provides a public service that can vary in quality across beneficiaries. Corruption would 
be an allocation mechanism that favors the wealthy and the unscrupulous, as occurred 
in the healthcare system of Eastern Europe after the fall of the socialist systems. In 
those countries, healthcare remained a public responsibility but was not funded well 
enough to satisfy middle-class demands (Rose-Ackerman, 1995; Kornai and 
Eggleston, 2008; Stepurko, et al., 2015). As a result, a flourishing, but illegal private 
market for healthcare existed in many countries that permitted the old system to 
survive, but at low quality and with vastly unequal levels of care. If that system had 
coincided with a pandemic, the result could have been tragic. 
 
                                                 
23 See: Transparency International (2020).  
24 The mandate under the Affordable Care Act levied a fee on those who did not sign up for insurance 
under the ACA or for an equivalence or better plan. That portion of the act was repealed, effective in 2019 
(Eibner and Nowak, 2018).  
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The political economy of the coronavirus pandemic has created incentives for 
corruption, fraud, and self-dealing. Along with the generous behavior of many millions 
of front-line workers, government officials, and private individuals and firms, others 
have sought to take advantage of the situation to benefit at the expense of the public 
and of victims of the pandemic. This anti-social behavior is readily explained by the 
underlying economic incentives at work in a health-related crisis where government 
must act quickly in a haze of uncertainty about the best path forward. Unlike other 
sorts of catastrophes, related to the weather, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, a 
health emergency raises special problems. Patients face problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection that undermine free market solutions and demand a public 
sector response, even in ordinary times. Furthermore, neither a vaccine nor an anti-
viral medicine existed when the coronavirus began to spread worldwide. The rapid 
response of pharmaceutical researchers produced several vaccines in record time, 
but this effort co-existed with both fraudulent cures and over-priced or useless 
protective equipment. 
Although some malfeasance was probably inevitable in a pandemic, it should 
not be ignored. Overall, those who benefit from corruption, be they contractors or 
individuals, will emerge from the pandemic better off than before it started if 
governments do not act. Tolerance of malfeasance will be at the expense of long-term 
government legitimacy and lead to the spread of the virus to the most vulnerable. The 
need for a speedy response should not be an excuse for undermining institutions that 
strengthen governmental integrity.  
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